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ECONOMIES OF SCOPE IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Patrick VAN CAYSEELE 
Abstract 
In this paper we derive the cost function for an inno-
vator who completes two R.& D.-projects. We show then how 
this function includes the costs for two single project in-
novators as a special case. A comparison of the costs of in-
novation under these alternative R.&D.-organisations re-
veals that although the multiproject innovator benefits of 
intrafirm spillovers of knowledge between the projects, 
this is insufficient to conclude that he is less expensive. 
Therefore a static comparison of total knowledge necessary 
to complete different innovations leads toward the wrong 
conclusions regarding dynamic efficiency. 
In view of the recent concern by antitrust authorities 
with predatory R.&D.-investment strategies, we finally look 
at a sufficient condition for the existence of scope eco-
nomies. 
A methodological hint by R. De Bondt as well as the 
discussions with participants of the E.I.A.S.M.-symposium on 
Economies of Scope are gratefully acknowledged. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
The involuntary dissemination of R.&D. results has been 
put forward recently for justifying public interventions to 
stimulate industries' innovative performance iHartwick 
(1984), Spence (1984)). This inappropriability disincentive 
to engage in R.&D.-activities is an externality at the level 
of the market, i.e. it consists of knowledge overflows 
("spillovers") between rival innovators. In this paper, 
.. ······-·······-········ ........ _,,,,,,_,,,,, .. 
d y n ami c , e f f i c i en c y o f t he p r i v at e s e c t o r w i ll b e s t u d i e d 
when such spillovers exclusively exist b~~\,</e~J:l. research pro-
jec~.s if completed by a single innovator. The question that 
emerges is whether a single multi-project innovator is less 
costly than several innovators each having just one project 
on the agenda. And the related public policy issu.e is whe-
ther a large enterprise engaged in several R.&D.-projects of 
which some turn out to be unprofitable does so for predatory 
motives, or simply because the knowledge generated by 
research on one (perhaps unprofitable) project can be used 
to some extent in future projects. Recent U.S. antitrust 
interventions against I. B .M. precisely adress this problem 
(Pittman (1984))1>. 
In the paper we show that a simple comparison of total 
knowledge necessary to complete the different projects, as 
suggested by static intuition, is the wrong criterion for 
answering the cost-efficiency question. The reason is that 
when we account for diminishing returns to time compression 
(Scherer (1967), Mansfield (1968)), more knowlegde necessary 
to complete several projects can trigger diseconomies which 
outweigh the spillover advantage. The appropriate approach 
to the problem involves the application of the economies of 
scope concept to a multiproject R.&D.-cost function. The 
latter is obtained from a dynamic optimisation proces. With 
this analytical tool we can show that spillovers are a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for economies of 
scope. Another condition then is put forward which under 
certain circumstances is sufficient for the existence of 
economies of scope. 
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2. THE MODEL 
In this section we first present and discuss the 
features of the R.&D.-techno.logy. Then we derive the costs 
for a multiproject innovator. 
The innovator minimizes the discounted expenditures on 
the R.&D.-projects while accumulating enough knowledge to 
complete them by the resp. introduction dates T1 and L:. In 
order to have y units of knowledge, the innovator must spend 
l/a ya units of money. With a > 1 this amounts to the usual 
time compression diseconomies: if the innovator wishes to 
double the available knowledge at instant t, this more than 
doubles outlays that moment. Such an assumption most of the 
time underlies knowledge creation technologies (cfr. Kamien 
and Schwartz (1972), (1978), (1982); Lucas (1971); Vislie 
(1982a), (l982b), (1983)). The specific way to incorporate 
time compression diseconomies here is due to Reinganum 
(1982). 
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The innovator distributes the y units of knowledge ovef 
the projects on the agenda. The increase in the knowledge 
reached on the project with the latest completion date can 
be written as x·L(t) = s(t) y(t) where a dot denotes 
differentiation w.r.t. time, XL(~) stands for the cumulative 
knowledge reached on the latest project by time r, and s(t) 
stands for the share of y allocated to it at instant t. 
Similarly x·r(t) = (l s(t)) y(t) gives the increase in 
knowledge for the first project. 
Spillovers are taken into account in a very simple way: 
while in order to complete any project, an innovator has to 
accumulate an amount of knowledge A, in case he already has 
completed a project, this only amounts to B < A for his 
latest project. 
This R.&D.-proces can be schematically represented as 
fo.llows: 
Increase in knowledge 
for the prujects at t 
• ~(t)~ 
Total knowledge 
created in the 
lab. at t 
(1-s(t)) >y(t) 
s{t) 
0 ~ 
~ (t) 
) 
outlays 
needed 
at t 
Tn a more formal way, the cost function for the multiproject 
innovator satisfies: 
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7 
TL 
-rt 
..!. (y(t))8 dt min ! e (l) 
0 a y, s 
0 
s.t. ~(t) = (l-s(t)) y(t) (2) ~(0) = 0 (3) ~(TF) = A (4) 
0 
s(t) y(t) (5) ~(0) (6) ~(TL) s.t. ~(t) = = 0 = B (7) 
s.t. 0 ..; s (t) ..; 1 (8) 
where in view of the argumentation above 
TF is min [T1 ,T2], the finishing date of the earliest 
project 
TL is max [T1, T2], the finishing date of the latest 
project 
y(t) are the "units of knowledge" created at time t 
s c t) is the share of this knowledge which is allocated 
to the project with the latest completion date 
XF(t) is the cumulative knowledge reached by the project 
with the first completion date by time t 
XL(t) is the cumulative knowledge reached by the project 
with the latest completion date by time t 
A is the total knowledge needed to obtain an 
innovation 
B is the total knowledge needed to obtain an 
innovation if the innovator already has completed a 
project. With positive spillovers: B < A. 
a is the expenditure elasticity of knowledge, i.e. if 
knowledge has to increase by l %, monetary outlays 
increase by a %. With time compression diseconomies: 
a > l. 
r is the discount rate. 
The R.&D.-technology represented by equations (1)-(8) 
assumes that the spillovers in question only can be valued 
if the same research entity (laboratory) develops also the 
latest project. There is no possibility to sell the relevant 
knowledge which is know-how locked-up in the laboratories' 
experience2>. Therefore the necessary conditions for the 
existence of economies of scope are satisfied: 
"Economies of scope thus require both"the common and 
recurrent use of proprietary know-how or of a 
specialised and indivisible physical asset" (Teece, 
1980, p., 223), ~1!9 some element of market imperfection" 
(Olve (1985)). 
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But the same reason underlying this market imperfection--if 
consequently pursued--introduces an e,~ment counteracting 
the existence of scope economies int·1 the picture. If 
knowledge spillovers consist of knowhow locked up in_ the 
research unit that completed the first project in such a way 
that it cannot be transferred to another laboratory by a 
market transaction, it is reasonable to assume that com-
municati-on problems arise vis-a-vis additional researchers 
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as well. Consequently the only way to cash upon the 
spillovers is to let the same crew develop both projects. If 
this implies an increase in the research intensity of the 
team, time compress ion diseconomies entail higher out lays. 
To put it simply, if investigators working in the lab. have 
to carry out additional assignments in order to finish the 
latest project in time, on top of their usual activities, 
overtime payments and other premiums increase more than 
proportionally the expenditures needed. Therefore we 
included time compression diseconomies at the level of the 
lab., not at the level of individual research projects. As 
wi 11 become clear below, this is the force counteracting 
scope. But first let us solve problem (l)-(8) for the 
multiproject innovator. 
B. Solution 
The multiproject innovator can follow either a 
sequential or a parallel R.&D.-strategy in order to 
introduc~ at T1 and T2. The cost of each option as well as 
the con<itions under which each option will prevail 
optimally are summarised in proposition l. 
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Proposition 1: a) The cost of parallel introduction at T: 
and Tz is given by 
1 
c I I (T 1 'T2 ;A,B) ... v(T2-T 1) {a---------
_r_ T 
((a-l)(ea-1 2-l))a-1 
} 
r 
-TJ 
((a-l)(ea-1 -l))a-1 
(9) 
b) The cost of sequential introduction at T: 
and Tz is given by 
Aa ra-1 a a-1 B r 
C{}(T 1 ,T 2 ;A,B) = v(T2-T 1) {-----r-T ____ + ------------r T r T 
a-1 1 a-1 a-1 2 a-1 1 a-1 
A 
- < v(T -T ) B 2 1 
a((a-1)(e -1)) a((a-l)(e - e )) 
a a-1 A r 
(10) 
c) A parallel strategy is followed whenever3> 
-------- + v(T 1-T2) r T r T 
a-1 2 a-1 1 (e - e ) 
_!_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ 1) 
_r_ T r T 
a-1 1 a-1 2 (e - e ) 
(11) 
where v is an indicator function satisfying 
v(arg.) = l if arg. > 0 
= 0 if arg. ::; 0 
and /I and { } are the s ym b o 1 s used to indicate a par a 11 e l 
resp. sequential strategy henceforth. 
Proof: 
The proof is the same regardless T1 > < Tz and therefore is 
given in TF and TL. It gives the cost of both options as 
well as condition (11). Starting from equations (l) to (8), 
the problem of finding an optimal path from 0 to TL is de-
composed in finding an optimal path from 0 to TF and an op-
timal path from TF to TL given that the initial conditions 
of the latter form the endpoint conditions of the first, and 
need to be determined in an optimal way. The strategy is to 
start with the problem of reaching TL optimally assuming 
that one arrived already optimally in TF (part a). This 
yields a cost function in the time remainder TL Tr, to 
acquire the remainder of knowledge B - S. Then we solve from 
0 to TF and include this cost function as a salvage value 
(part b). This enables us to find the optimal value of the 
state variable of the latest project at time TF which then 
is used to obtain the final form of the cost enveloppe and 
to find condition (11). 
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part a: 
The cost for adding B - S units of knowledge on the project 
with the latest completion date during the period T~ - Tr. 
It can be shown by straightforward application of the method 
proposed by Kamien and Schwartz (1972) that these costsare 
r 
= _ (B-S)a ( ---------- )a-1 
a r T _!_T 
a-1 L a-1 F (a- J) (e - e ) 
(12) 
In part b of the proof a detailed derivation of a similar 
result is given. 
part b: 
We now seek the costs for completing the first project, as 
well as already creating S units of knowledge for the latest 
project during the period [0 Tr], where S has to be 
determined optimally. This is tantamount to solve the 
program 
TF 
min ( f -rt a e (y(t)) dt + C(TL- TF B-S)) 
y' s 0 a (13) 
0 
s.t. xF(t) = (1-s(t)) y(t) (2) rep. xF(O) == 0 (3) rep. ~(TF) = A (4) rep. 
0 -
s. t. ~ (t) == s(t) y(t) (5) rep. xL(O) = 0 (6) rep. 
s.t. 0 ~ s(t) ~ l (10) rep. 
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We proceed by forming the Hamiltonian: 
(15) 
In view of condition (10), the associated Lagrangean is 
L - H + Wl ( l - s ( t) ) + W2 s ( t) ( 16) 
where it holds that 
Wl ;:::: 0 (17) (18) 
Wl ( l - S ( t) ) = 0 (19) W2 S ( t) = 0 (20) 
Then following conditions are both necessary and sufficient 
(Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977)): 
aL 
--ay 
-rt a-1 
-e y + oF(t)(J-s(t)) + oL(t) s(t) E 0 (21) 
(22) 
0 aL 
- oF(t) =-- = 0 
axF (23) 
0 aL 
oL (t) =-- = 0 a~ (24) 
l:l 
Transversality conditions include: 
(B-S)a-1 a-1 
~~ r oL(TF) = (25) as 
_E_ T _E_ T 
a-1 L 
_ ea-1 F)] a-1 [ (a-1) ( e 
s~o (26) (6L ac s 0 (27) +E) = 
From (23) and (24) it is clear that the o's are con-
stants. Conditions (27) has an interesting economic inter-
pr:-~t~~.~()f!: if the shadow cost of research for the latest 
project before the completion of the first exceeds the mar-
ginal cost of additional knowledge after completion (oL ' 
C/ S), the amount of knowledge reached on that project 
equals zero. Intuitively it is clear that it will not be op-
timal to spent on research before TP if the resulting know-
ledge can be added more cheaply later on. Conversely, when-
ever there has been spending for research, we have (25) hol-
ding with equality, a condition that will be useful in '.e 
determination of the optimal S. 
We now rewrite (22) as 
OL) y(t) = Wl - W2 (28\ 
Therefore, whenever S > 0, not only will OL be equal to 
- C/ S, it will also equal OF' for S > 0 implies s :, 0 or w::: 
= 0, together with 1 - s > 0, a condition that always holds, 
imp 1 yin g w 1 = 0 . As y ( t l i s now z e r o , from ( 2 8 ) t o g e t her 
with (27) we have 
C/ S 
an important condition associated with P~E.~} .. ! ... ~~ research (S 
> 0). For S = 0, or a sequenti~l research strategy, we have 
s = 0 allowing w2 > 0 or OF' > OL. Together with ( 27) this 
results in 
OF' > OL > - C/ S ( 30) 
We will now distinguish according to these two cases of 
parallel and sequential research in solving the problem. 
A. The parallel research strategy, or (29) holds. 
First order conditirn (21) now can be written 
-rt a-l 
- e y + 6 • 0 L (31) 
which enables us to obtain following expression for y(t): 
-y(t) = oLa-1 
r 
a-l t 
e (32) 
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From the boundary conditions and the state equations 
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (14) we have: 
(A+S) 
TF 
= J y(t)dt = 
0 
1 
·--
_!_ T (a-1) (ea-1 F 
- 1) 
r 
(33) 
which enables us to find an expression for OL and to 
eliminate this variable from (32). The expression for OL is 
useful in determining together with (25) the optimal value 
of S. This value is given by 
r T 
_!_ T _!_ T 
a-1 F 1) a-1 L a-1 F (e 
-
(e 
- e ) 
s = B A (34) 
_::__ T 
_!_ T 
a-1 L l) a-1 L (e 
- (e - 1) 
Eliminating OL from (32) and integrating yields the cost 
function as 
r 
=- (A+S)a ( -------- )a-1 
a _!_T 
(a-J)(ea-1 F- l) 
(35) 
Taking this expression together with expression (12) and 
substituting for the optimal value of S as given by :: 34) 
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then gives the final expression for the costs of parallel 
research as 
=-
a 
(36) 
which proves part a) of proposition l. 
B. The sequential research strategy, or (30) holds. 
As s = 0, first order condition (21) becomes 
e-rt y(t)a-1 + = 0 (37) 
which enables us to obtain following expression for y(t): 
y (t) 
-
r 
a-1 t 
e (38) 
From the boundary conditions and the state equations (2), 
i .., \ 
\ u ; ' (4) and given that s = 0, we have 
TF_ 
A = ! (1-s(t)) y(t)dt 
0 
a-1 y(t)dt .. 6F 
_r_ T 
(a-1) a-1 F (e - J) 
r 
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(39) 
which enables us to find an expression for op. Using this 
expression to eliminate op in (38), and integrating gives 
the cost function as 
r 
C{} (TF;A,O) = ~ Aa ( ----r--T---
a-1 F (a-l)(e - l) 
a- I ) (40) 
Adding this expression to expression (12) in which we 
substitute S = 0 gives the final expression for the costs of 
sequential research as 
A a a-1 Ba a-1 r r 
= +-
18 
C{}(TF,TL;A,B) a 
_!_ T a r T r T 
a-1 F l)a-1 (a-l)a-1 a-1 L a-1 F a-1 (a-l)a-1 (e - (e - e ) 
( 41) 
which proves part b) of proposition 1. 
Now taking up the lead at equation (34), we see that 
s > 0 iff 
r T 
a-1 F (e - 1) 
r T _!_T 
a-1 L a-1 F (e - e ) 
> A 
B , (42) or (11) rep. 
. which proves part c) of proposition 1. 
We now have an an~lytical tool describing the costs of 
multiproject innovation. The next issue we turn to is a 
comparison with the well-known single project costs. 
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3. ECONOMIES OF SCOPE: MULTIPROJECT VS. SINGLE PROJECT 
INNOVATORS 
In this section we first show how the multiproject cost 
function 
functions 
derived 
used 
encompasses 
previously in 
the 
the 
single project 
literature. We 
cost 
then 
investigate under what conditions economies of scope are 
present in the underlying R.&D.-technology. Knowledge over-
flows between projects prove to be insufficient. Finally 
circumstances under which one can be sure of scope economies 
are put forward. 
20 
The cost for single project innovators can be obtained 
from the solution in proposition l, by noting that an 
innovator not undertaking a project is equivalent to an 
infinite completion date for that project. By the finiteness 
of the introduction date of the project which remains on the 
agenda (this introduction date is TP), the project which 
isn't done is the latest, and TL = ro. In such case the LHS 
of equation (42) will equal zero, so that the inequality is 
violated and the costs for the sequential option are to be 
used. At this point one ought to notice the usefulness of 
the two-branch formulation of the solution presented. As 
resp. the first, second project is dropped, we have resp. 
T1, T2 = oo and use resp. the second and first branch to plug 
in the infinite completion 
algorithm yields 
a-1 
r 
C(T 1,m;A) = ----------------------
_E_ T 
a-1 1 a 1 
and 
a((a-l)(e - 1)) -
a-1 
r 
cc~,T2 ;A) = ----------------------
_E_ T 
a-1 2 a-1 
a((a-l)(e - 1)) 
date. Application of this 
(43) 
(44) 
which are the well-known single project cost functions for 
innovations of magnitude A at introduction dates T1 and T2. 
As a single project innovator has no "latest" project for 
which the accumulation of knowledge on the first project 
yields spillovers, total knowledge is each time A. This 
structure of the R.&D.-industry can not validate spillovers, 
the reduced knowledge B does not appear in the solution. 
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B. Spi ll .. overs an~ .... e~.?P?. .. ~ie~ of !:;C?P~ 
The just mentioned fact that spillovers don't exist 
between projects conducted by several innovators while they 
ex i s t f o r a m u 1 t i p r o j e c t i n nov at or r e s u 1 t s i n· 1 e s s t o t a l 
knowledge needed to complete the projects when done by a 
multiproject innovator. Instead of 2 A, only A + B (remember 
B < A) has to be done. Can we conclude from this that the 
costs for joint research are lower? This question is equi-
valent to ask for the existence of economies of scope in the 
research technology. In order to answer it we redefine the 
scope economics concept to become operational for this 
intertemporal context as follows: 
Definition l. Economies of scope in R.&D. exist whenever 
(45) 
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Not ice that the idea in ( 45) is the same as the one behind 
the usual definition (Baumol,. Panzar and Willig '1982)) but 
zero quantities of physical output there become infinite 
introduction dates for innovations in this context. 
Proposition 2: Spillovers are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for economies of scope 
Proof :As there are two options for the multiproject 
innovator,we have to distinguish according to 
the strategy he chooses. 
For a sequential strategy the existence of scope 
implies (for T1 < T2 ): 
a-1 
r 
r T _!_T 
a-1 2 a-1 1 a-1 
a((a-l)(e - e ) 
< 
_!_ T _!_ T 
a-1 2 a-1 1 a-1 (e - e ) 
or B < ( A ) a 
_!_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ 1) 
a-1 
r 
_!_ T 
a-1 2 a 1 
a((a-l)(e - 1)) -
(47) 
Now B/A < 1 but also the RHS of (47) in view of 
Tz - T1 < Tz has this property and hence spillovers 
are by no means a sufficient condition to guarantee 
scope,although clearly they are necessary. 
For a parallel strategy the existence of scope 
implies (for T1 < Tz ): 
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(46) 
a 
_E_ T 
((a-l)(ea-1 2 _ l))a-1 
or 
Aa ra-1 
<.!. ----------
a 
_!_ T 
((a-l)(ea-1 1 _ l))a-1 
_E_ T 
a-1 2 
+ 
a-1 
r 
a r 
- -T ((a-l)(ea-1 2- l))a-1 
24 
(48) 
( A+B )a < ( 
A 
( e - 1) a-1 
) + (49) 
_!_ T (ea-1 l _ 1) 
Now B < A only implies that LHS (49) is smaller 
smaller than 2A but this does not prevent it from 
exceeding RHS (49) in which case no economies of 
scope- prevail. Again (49) can be seen to be violated 
whenever B ~ A hence the necessity of spillovers. 
What is the reason beyond this result? Suppose the 
multiproject innovator follows a sequential strategy.On the 
one hand he has an advantage in knowledge in comparison to 
the innovator completing the latest project, but on the 
other hand he has the disadvantage of having less time to 
complete the latest project. Time compression diseconomies 
prevalent in the (T2 - T1) interval can destroy the positive 
externalities in knowledge. The immediate question arising 
is then why not turn to a parallel research strategy? This 
will leave less knowledge to be generated on the second 
project in the interval (T2 - T1). But then more knowledge 
must result from research in the first period for in 
addition to the completion of the first project also the 
second has to be served. Again the 
compression diseconomies will increase 
prevailing 
more than 
time 
pro-
portionally the necessary research outlays (which are closer 
in time and therefore more heavily discounted) so that the 
positive externalities might be outweighted. Therefore, in 
general, spillovers are by no means sufficient to induce 
economies of scope for in comparison with the single project 
innovators the multiproject innovator has a time avai-
lability disadvantage. Time compression diseconomies induced 
by the larger knowledge vis-a-vis each of the single project 
innovators taken separately then can outweigh the knowledge 
advantage that exists vis-a-vis the single project inno-
vators taken together. This is basically what conditions 
(47) and (49) tell us: spillovers must be big enough (B 
small enough) to compensate for the smaller time remaining 
to complete a second project. In each of the conditions this 
emerges in a ~ifferent way for each represents a different 
R.&D. strategy but one sees that both conditions are likely 
to be violated if the spillover advantage (A - B) is small 
(too little) and/or the finishing date for the second 
project shortly follows after the introduction date of the 
first project (too late). 
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C . A s u f f i c i en t c o n d i t i on f o r e con om i e s <?f sc () pe 
As just argued, the mere fact that spillovers exist is 
not sufficient to conclude in favour of scope. What ·is 
needed is a proof of laJ:::g~ .~!l.<?.U.:g.~ spillovers. Needless to 
say that given the unobservable nature of these exter-
nalities this is difficult. Fortunately under certain cir-
cumstances the choice of strategy by the multiproject in-
novator himself will be sufficient to ensure the existence 
of scope. Th.e idea is that spillovers will be big enough to 
induce scope if the completion date of the second project 
follows really shortly after the first introduction and 
still the innovator can complete the projects in a sequen-
tial way more cheaply than with a parallel strategy. This 
implies indeed that spillovers are sufficiently large so 
that no results for the second project must be generated be-
fore T1 in view of too much compression diseconomies in the 
[T2 - T1 ]-'interval, so that letting another innovator work 
during the entire time interval [0 - T2] solely on the se-
cond project will not save enough costs through time decom-
pression to compensate for the spillover loss. How short the 
second date has to follow on the first depends among other 
things on the knowledge outlay elasticity and the discount 
rate, variables that can be estimated more easily. 
To show this we start from the condition determining 
the choice of strategy for the multiproject innovator and 
ask when this conditions in strong enough to guarantee 
scope. Or given that a sequential strategy is followed and 
hence 
B 
A 
_r_ T _!_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ ea-1 1) 
_!_ T 
(e a-1 1 _ 1) 
when is this sufficient to induce 
B 
A 
_!_ T _!_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ ea-1 1) a-1 
< ( -------- ) a 
_r_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ 1) 
(50) 
(51) 
given the values of the parameters a and r? Clearly this 
occurs only if 
_r_ T _!_ T 
(ea-1 2 a-1 l 
- e ) 
_!_ T 
(ea-1 1 _ l) 
< ( 
_!_T _!_r· 
(ea-1 2 a-1 1 a-1 
- e ) 
--------- ) a 
_!_ T 
(ea-1 2 _ 1) 
(52) 
which is equivalent to 
(53) 
Condition (53) is likely to be satisfied for research 
environments with introduction dates as depicted in the fi-
gure below 
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> 
t 
0 
The question however is how close T1 and Ta have to be 
given the parameter values of a and r? For this purpose it 
is convenient to redefine Tz = bT1, where b then is the 
factor by which Tz cannot exceed T1 in order to be sure that 
a sequential strategy also implies scope economies. Making 
this substitution in ;53) leaves us with still a fairly 
complex equation. As we assume a > l and further suppose 
that "a" takes on integer values, we have quadratic, cubic, 
quartic, ,equations, the roots of which yield values of 
fl b" for which our sufficiency theorem holds. For the 
following table we have fixed "a" at 2 and then calculated 
the difference between Tz and T1 in months for different 
values of r. These are the elements of the table. The 
interpretation is thus: 
for a discount rate of 10 ~~. a finishing date of the first 
project of 11 years and a second project finished 24 months 
later, and finally a sequential strategy followed, we can be 
sure of the existence of economies of scope. (If an entrv is 
empty in this table, there are no positive values. for which 
the sufficiency theorem holds). 
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Table 1. The number of months by which T2 can exceed T1 
(expressed in years) for different discount rates 
(r) expressed as % on a yearly base. 
-----------------·------------------------------------------
r 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 
5 19,0 34,6 
7,5 9,4 25,0 33,0 35,6 34,7 
8,75 3,5 20,6 28,6 30,5 29,0 25,9 
10,00 13,7 24,0 26,7 25,2 22,3 18,6 
14,00 13,1 19,2 18,2 14,9 11,7 9,1 7,1 
16,75 3,5 15,8 15,8 12,6 9,5 7,0 5,2 3,8 
19,5 8,7 14,2 11,8 8,6 6,1 4,3 3,0 2,1 
------------------------------------------------------------
For the computation of these values we applied 
discounting on a monthly basis, to approximate the conti-
nuous compounding in the analyses more closely. For any 
given introduction date of the first project, this table 
shows that an increase in "the discount rate first relaxes 
the range in which Tz has to fall in order to safely dismiss 
predatory R.&D., but beyond a point further increases in r 
constrain the safe range. Therefore one cannot simply 
generalise trends. 
Although a decrease of the "safe•• range with an 
increase of the discount rate has a nice intuitive appeal, 
for a higher discount rate makes a parallel strategy less 
attractive (monetary outlays spent early are more costly), 
the numerical analysis reveals that the intuition does not 
hold everywhere. 
Further numerical analyses of equation (53) as well as 
an analyses of other sufficiency theorems certainly has to 
be done in view of antitrust policies. At the present how-
ever we showed that under certain circmustances a sequential 
strategy provides enough evidence in favour of scope 
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economies. One however can not stress enough the sufficient 
nature of the condition: by no means can a parallel strategy 
be viewed as evidence pointing to the non-existence of scope 
economies. The only policy implication to be drawn from this 
research therefore is that predatory behavior can be 
dismissed in view of a sequential strategy under certain 
circumstances and with the underlying assumptions of the 
model holding true. Given the many extensions we will in-
dicate as a matter of concluding this paper, a lot of future 
research remains to be done in order to use the above re-
sults in real world antitrust cares. It should however be 
clear that if anything is to be said on predatory R. &D. 
strategies, it has to come from an analysis of the above ty-
pe. In view of the unobservable nature of the magnitude of 
the spillovers, one can only rely on conditions in which the 
innovators actions together with observable variables reveal 
enough. Of course, if one takes entrepreneurs' actions as 
rules of thumb, it might pay to adopt that kind of behaviour 
in order to avoid antitrust litigation. Future analyses also 
should take this into account. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper has derived the costs for a mul t iproject 
innovator who benefitted from spillovers between the re-
search projects. These showed to be insufficient to induce 
economies of scope. And the last condition itself is well-
known to be insufficient for subaddi ti vi ty of the cost 
function. Thus the existence of natural R. & D. -monopolies 
recquires more than just these often mentioned technological 
spillovers. What is needed is evidence of "large" spill-
overs, but how can this be established given the 
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unobservable nature of the variable involved? In the paper 
we put forward conditions under which one could infer scope 
economies from an endogenous choice between different R.&D.-
strategies followed by the innovator. Future research might 
set out for conditions from which one can infer subad-
ditivity, and t~ke into account that the magnitude of the 
spilloyers might change with the option (sequential or 
parallel) chosen. In related research - however not focus-
sing on the economies of scope issue - this has been the 
case (Van Cayseele (1985)). 
Other extensions include a-symetric spillovers. At the 
present, spillovers imply that the project finished latest 
benefitted from the knowledge reached on behalf of an 
earlier project. With project related spillovers, however, 
knowledge overflows realise from working on a specific pr~­
ject (say the second). It then is obvious that a sequential 
strategy (for T;:; > T1) results in no spillovers at all. Also 
under these circumstances the choice of strategy can reveal 
information on the existence of scope economies, but in a 
different way. 
Finally, no technical uncertainty exists in the problem 
formulation of this paper. Once a certain amount of research 
has been reached the innovation is completed. Often however 
the only thing that can be said is that the probability of 
succes increases in the knowledge already reached on a pro-
ject. The nature of the R.&D.-process then is stochastic. 
Spillovers now can have still another nature if f.i. the 
probability of having one succes affects the probability of 
a succes on a related project. 
A final observation is related to positive rather than 
normative implications following from the above model. 
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Recent empirical research by Aoki (1984) on what he calls 
the "hiving off" activities of large Japanese business 
groups during the late sixties and seventies revealed that 
parent firms do not specialise in "brain" activities or de--
legate only routine activities to the related firms. His em-
pirical findings show that also R.& D.-activities have been 
hived off with 11 f1-'asteful duplication of R.& D.-"""fforts in 
these multiple units" (Aoki (1984), p.l93, ritalics mi-
ne)) .These results thus support the claims made in this 
paper. But we show how duplication is not (always) wasteful 
in a true economic sense. As certain real world dynamic 
features of the R.& D.-process such as time compression 
diseconomies are brought into the picture, the non-in-
tegrated solution follows out of minimum cost consi-
derations. Of course, still other reasons (e.g. providing 
incentives through competition) might explain decentralised 
R. & D. out of optimal behaviour of the innovator. Therefore 
this research hopefully provides the framework for rethin-
king some existing analyses on innovative activities in 
terms of the theory of economies of scope. 
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NOTES 
1. More precisely, Pittman (1984) says: 
"In any industry in which technological change in rapid, 
the benefits of the development of a new product are 
likely to include improvements in other products sold by 
the firm and information which leads to the development 
of future ~roducts. These 'externalities' - external to 
the particular product line, internal to the firm - are 
likely to be difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, a 
rational firm must take them into account in its 
investment planning, and an analyst testing for 
predatation must include them in the benefits of a 
program". 
2. In Nelsons' terminology (Nelson (1982)), the spillovers 
concerned are related to the "technique" part of 
technology (referring to a way of tackling problems in 
the pursuit of technology) which remains private rather 
than to the "logy" component (referring to the 
theoretical part of technology) that becomes public. If 
however knowledge overflows are of the easily 
disseminated know-why character of science, the market 
failures are even more obvious: why should someone pay 
for something he can obtain freely? 
3. This is of course tantamount to 
Conditions (11) is however preferred over the above 
expression for it shows in the case of infinite 
introduction dates that the sequential option must be 
used to plus in ro. For such cases the above expression 
would give a zero. 
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